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THE OHIO BARGAINING
IMPASSE PROCEDURES: AN
OUTSIDER'S VIEW*
Arvid Anderson**
APRIL FOOL'S DAY is an appropriate time to evaluate the first
year of experience under the new Ohio Public Employees' Col-
lective Bargaining Law.' Although one year has passed on the cal-
endar, there has been little actual administrative experience under
the Act. But things seem to be progressing under the able leader-
ship of Chairman Day and the fine staff of the Ohio Board, with the
cooperation of the Ohio public sector labor-management
community.
At a conference of this nature it is expected that the shortcom-
ings of the statute will be pointed out and that many of its strengths
will be overlooked or given scant attention. As one who has spent
some thirty-five years administering both public and private sector
bargaining laws in Wisconsin and New York City, I want to make a
few observations about evaluating collective bargaining statutes.
My first experience with collective bargaining statutes was the
Wisconsin Employment Peace Act2 which was enacted in 1939, but
lay somewhat dormant during the World War II years. This Wis-
consin law of 1939 served as a model for the Taft-Hartley Act of
19473 and in large measure, the Landrum-Griffn Act of 1959.' The
Wisconsin law, which also covered agricultural employees, was de-
nounced by organized labor at the time of its enactment, but not
today. Similarly, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 was denounced by
organized labor at the time of its enactment as a "slave labor act."
* The text of this Article, with minor changes, was presented at the Ohio Public
Sector Labor Law Colloquium, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Cleveland,
Ohio, April 1, 1984.
** Chairman, New York City Office of Collective Bargaining.
1. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-.23 (Page 1984).
2. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ ll1.01-.19 (West 1974), as last amended by ch. 361, L.1981.
3. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 40-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified
as amended in 29 U.S.C. § 141 eL seq.).
4. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 164, 186, 187, 401 eL seq.).
THE OHIO BARGAINING IMPASSE PROCEDURES
While there is an extensive debate this year (the half-century anni-
versary of the Wagner Act) over whether the Taft-Hartley Act
should be repealed, my suspicion is that the criticism is directed at
the current administration of the statute rather than with the sub-
stantive provisions which protect the right to organize and bargain
collectively. One of the lessons that I have learned as an adminis-
trator of labor relations statutes is that good and fair administra-
tion, even of what is regarded as a bad law, can make an enormous
difference in the acceptability of the objectives of the statute. By the
same token, poor administration of the best possible law can result
in the defeat of the statutory purpose. Finally, not even a good law
with good administration is likely to succeed if there is strong oppo-
sition to its acceptance by the labor-management community.
A collective bargaining statute, unlike other statutes governing
conditions of employment such as wages and hours,5 age discrimi-
nation,6 or equal employment opportunities,7 does not depend on
the provisions of that statute for determining the conditions of em-
ployment. Rather, it provides the means by which the parties can
establish their own working and employment conditions. The point
is that the cooperation of the parties in accepting the purposes of
the statute, that collective bargaining is the best means for resolving
questions concerning the employer's needs and the employee's
desires, is essential to sound labor relations.
If that concept is accepted by the parties as a desirable precept,
the law will work. As for the technical deficiencies in the statute, it
must be remembered that lawyers can figure out how to do things as
well as how not to. I am not suggesting that the statutory encum-
brances be disregarded; but rather that they should not be used to
defeat worthwhile objectives. Willard Wirtz once observed that
what is required to make collective bargaining work in the public
sector is an employer who will say "I will or I won't, rather than I
can't." That kind of problem solving attitude can make a world of
difference in making the statute work in the public interest.
My experience has also taught me that there is seldom a single
dispute mechanism which is the absolute ideal for resolving labor
disputes, especially in the public sector. The drafters of the Ohio
statute have clearly recognized that fact by providing a considerable
5. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982).
6. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
7. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 86 Stat. 103 (codi-
fied as amended in 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108, 5314-16; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1-6, 2000e-8,
2000e-9, 2000e-13-17).
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variety of options which the parties may choose to settle their own
dispute. These include conventional arbitration; last best offer
either as a package, or issue by issue, or in combination thereof with
the fact finders recommendation; or settlement by a citizens council
of three persons residing within the jurisdiction of the public em-
ployer; and the broadest option of all, any other dispute settlement
procedure mutually agreed to by the parties.' The latter option
may prove to be the wisest, because it will afford the parties an op-
portunity to fashion a scheme which best suits their particular needs
and desires. The wide variety of options afforded should enable the
Ohio Public Employment Advisory and Counseling Effort Commis-
sion to make sound recommendations for both administrative and
legislative improvements based upon actual experience. Advisory
Committees have been very helpful in developing amendments to
the Wisconsin and New York statutes.
In evaluating the progress that has been made under the Ohio
statute, I respectfully suggest that you may want to examine the
reported experiences of a number of other states with impasse pro-
cedures similar to Ohio's. Professor Richard Lester of Princeton
University recently completed a major study on labor arbitration in
state and local governments.9 He examined the experience under
the Pennsylvania,' 0 New York," Minnesota,12 Iowa,1 3 Michigan, 14
Massachusetts,' 5 New Jersey,' 6 Wisconsin17 and New York City'"
collective bargaining laws. Three of those states, Pennsylvania,19
New York20 and Minnesota,2" as well as New York City2 have
8. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(1)(a-f) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984).
9. R. LESTER, LABOR ARBITRATION IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: AN Ex-
AMINATION OF EXPERIENCE IN EIGHT STATES AND NEW YORK Crn" (1984).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp. 1985). See also, Police
and Firefighters Arbitration Act, 1968 Pa. Laws 111.
11. N.Y. Cv. SERv. LAW §§ 200-14 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1984).
12. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.61-.76 (West 1971) (codified as amended at § 179A .01-
.25 (West Supp. 1985)).
13. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 90.1-.27 (West 1984).
14. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.231-.246 (1978 & Supp. 1985).
15. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 8 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985).
16. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-14- 13A-21 (West Supp. 1985).
17. Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.80-.94 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985) (covering state employ-
ees); Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70-111.71 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985) (covering municipal em-
ployees); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985) (covering police and fire
employees).
18. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1173-1.0-11.0 (1975 & Supp. 1984).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.801-.806(a) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
20. N.Y. CiV. SERV. LAW § 209 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1984).
21. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 197A.16-.21 (West Supp. 1985).
22. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 1173-7.0 (1975 & Supp. 1984).
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conventional arbitration as the last step in their impasse procedure.
Michigan, Iowa, Wisconsin and New Jersey all have variations of
the last offer procedure. Wisconsin has last offer as a single package
for police and fire,23 and has a "newer" statute, called the Med-Arb
Statute,' 4 for other municipal employees. Iowa has final offer, issue
by issue, but also allows the arbitrator to pick the final offer of the
fact finder.2' That option is included as a possible option in your
procedure. Michigan has final offer on an economic package, but
issue by issue on other matters.-6 New Jersey has last offer with
economic issues as a single package and non-economic on an issue
by issue basis.' 7
Massachusetts has a unique Joint Labor-Management Commit-
tee system28 which is more akin to conventional arbitration. The
effectiveness of that statute has been affected by the enactment of
Proposition Two and a Half' 9 which eliminated the Committee's
power to issue binding settlements. However, the uniquely persua-
sive efforts of Committee Chairman John Dunlop has been success-
ful in maintaining the effectiveness of the Joint Committee to
resolve a large number of disputes.
These statutory variations were developed to a considerable ex-
tent because of the joint efforts of labor and management, in the
respective jurisdictions, in drafting a statute to meet their individual
needs. Several of those statutes were amended from their original
enactment based upon actual experience. Thus, when there is suffi-
cient experience under the Ohio law it will be appropriate to evalu-
ate whether the purposes of the statute have been fulfilled or
whether changes are needed.
Certainly one of the major purposes of the statute is to resolve
impasses and avoid strikes. Considering the unhappy experience of
Ohio and a number of other jurisdictions with police and fire
strikes, as well as lengthy teacher strikes, it certainly is worthwhile
to evaluate whether the law has aided in eliminating strikes.
Another basis for evaluating the statute is whether the arbitra-
tion awards have been fair and issued with due regard for the care-
fully drafted statutory criteria. These criteria include not only
23. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985).
24. Id. § 111.70.
25. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 90.11-.12 (West 1984).
26. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.239 (1978 & Supp. 1985).
27. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-16 (West Supp. 1985).
28. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 23C, § 1-4 (West Supp. 1985) (chairman of concilia-
tion board has power to appoint joint labor management committees).
29. 1980 Mss. Acts 580.
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comparability, in both public and private employment or similar
work classifications; but also comparisons with other collectively
bargained agreements, the interests and welfare of the public includ-
ing ability to pay and the affect of the contract on the quality of
public service, the lawful authority of the public employer, the stip-
ulations of the parties and other relevant factors normally consid-
ered in collective bargaining, mediation, fact finding or arbitration
in public and private employment.3° The evaluation should con-
sider how effectively the arbitrators, whether called fact finders,
conciliators or arbitrators, performed their functions and whether
they have acted largely as judges, or as legislators with a sensitive
eye on the statutory standards and the needs of the parties. Evalua-
tion of how the statute has worked should also take into account the
record of judicial review.31
The Ohio statute has particularly emphasized, at least by impli-
cation, the importance of the legislative function, by requiring, in
the case of fact finding, a three-fifths vote of the total membership of
the legislative body as well as a three-fifths vote of the total mem-
bership of the employee organization to reject the recommenda-
tions.32 Clearly, in such circumstances, the factor of acceptability
of the fact finding process and recommendations is critical. Thus
the ability of the neutrals as mediators, either in resolving the issues
or in being sensitive to the areas of possible settlement or acceptabil-
ity, is critically important. These traits are more akin to the legisla-
tive than to the judicial process.
It will be important for the conciliators when issuing final and
binding awards, and in those circumstances where fact finding
awards become final and binding, for the neutral to give persuasive
reasons for the conclusions reached. It is not good enough to say
that the evidence and statutory criteria have been reviewed. Neu-
trals should cite the specific basis for a wage award and a demon-
stration of ability to pay. This is necessary not only for the
acceptability of the award under the statutory standards, but also in
recognition of the legislative function, which has been delegated to
the neutral. It should be obvious that the delegation of legislative
authority should be exercised in accordance with the scope of bar-
gaining allowed by the statute and that the neutrals should take
care not to exceed the powers granted to them by the statute. The
failure to do so will invite judicial review.
30. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(G)(7)(a-f) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984).
31. Id. § 4117.14(H) (providing for judicial review in courts of common pleas).
32. Id § 4117.14(C)(6).
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Another basis for evaluation will be the effect of the statute on
the collective bargaining process. Whether arbitration and fact
finding have been a substitute for the collective bargaining process is
difficult to evaluate. In some jurisdictions there will have been col-
lective bargaining prior to the passage of the statute. Although I
recognize that a large number of jurisdictions have participated in
collective bargaining prior to the enactment of the statute, if Ohio's
experience is similar to the other jurisdictions in Professor Lester's
study, arbitration awards will induce other parties to reach an
agreement. Experience in other states indicates that there is a high
probability of settlement, especially where there is an opportunity
for mediation either as a separate function or by the fact finder or
neutral.
The fact that a considerable number of employers and employee
organizations in Ohio have agreed voluntarily to dispute settlement
procedures which are more realistic in terms of the statutory time-
table is an encouraging sign. I have heard that much of the criti-
cism of your current statute centers on the time procedures,
charging they are unrealistic with either a sixty or ninety day bar-
gaining period. The possibility of intervention by the Ohio Board
on the forty-fifth day, with mediation for fifteen days and then fact
finding for two weeks is a very compressed timetable, even if the
parties and neutrals cooperate. But a fixed time schedule is not al-
ways bad. The drafter of the Ohio statute had to be aware that the
absence of deadlines meant that parties would be unwilling to act.
Deadlines are needed to make bargaining work. The Postal Service
arbitration procedure worked very well with a similarly tight sched-
ule. Since the strike is not permitted except under limited condi-
tions, a stimulus to the bargaining process was needed and calendar
deadlines are part of the solution. Based upon my own experience
in New York City where we have few statutory deadlines, I can
report that the absence of such deadlines can result in very pro-
longed negotiations or impasse procedures. There are no ideal
solutions, but the best that can be found is one where the parties
have developed their own processes which compel decisionmaking
with reasonable opportunities to accommodate to changing
circumstances.
The Ohio statute imposes substantial obligations on the Board
for the administration of strike penalties. The Board, on the request
of a public employer, who has obtained a temporary restraining or-
der, is responsible for determining whether a strike constitutes a
19851
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threat to the health and safety of the community.3 While most
employees who are likely to cause such problems, if they strike, do
not have the right to strike, other groups with the protected right to
strike conceivably could cause such a problem. Employees of sewer
and water departments, and health and hospital workers are exam-
ples of employees who could cause a threat to health and safety if
they struck. It is my view that the determination as to whether a
strike could constitute a genuine threat to health and safety is really
an executive decision to be made by a governor, a mayor or county
executive and not by a labor relations agency. Although I believe
the authority to make such a determination can under some condi-
tions be constitutionally delegated, I am not at all comfortable with
a policy that requires such decisions to be made by an administra-
tive body created for its labor relations expertise. My labor rela-
tions expertise as a mediator of a New York City sanitation strike
was of little value when the Mayor, on the advice of the Commis-
sioner of Health, declared a health crisis, sought an injunction and
asked the governor to send the National Guard. The Ohio proce-
dure does have the advantage of ensuring more consistent determi-
nations since all of the determinations are made by a single agency,
rather than by trial courts located throughout the state. Neverthe-
less, that objective could be achieved by creating a special judicial
panel to hear all such cases.
Perhaps a larger policy issue has been created by charging the
Board with the responsibility for enforcing the two for one penalty;
the loss of two days pay for each day a worker is on an illegal
strike.34 I do not want to be misunderstood. I do not object to
effective penalties for an illegal strike and, based on New York's
experience, the two for one penalty is effective. My point is, how-
ever, that the responsibility for enforcing the penalty provisions
places the Board in a position which could conflict with its duty to
mediate or assist in the resolution of disputes. In addition, knowl-
edge gained in the effort to settle the dispute by mediation could
create the appearance that the Board exercised its penalty powers,
or refused to exercise them, based on its knowledge of the parties
conduct in mediation.
Let me illustrate. In the fall of 1973, New York City exper-
ienced a five and a half hour firefighters strike. Acting as a media-
tor, I learned certain facts about why the union called the strike,
33. Id § 4117.16(A).
34. Id § 4117.23(B)(3).
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which subsequently could have been the subject of both civil and
criminal penalties. At the same time, if I had been called upon as
the Chairman of the New York City Board of Collective Bargaining
to impose the two for one penalty or to seek an injunction on the
ground that the strike posed a threat to health and safety, which I
fully believed it did since there were only 150 firefighters on duty at
the time, I did not see how my role as a mediator and a strike pen-
alty enforcer could be reconciled.
The appearance of fairness and impartiality is as important in
the administration of a labor relations statute as is the existence of
fairness and impartiality itself. Therefore, it is my view that strike
penalties should be a matter for court enforcement, rather than en-
forcement by a labor relations agency.
Since the Ohio legislature has decided otherwise, my advice is
that your Board do all it can to separate the responsibility for ad-
ministration of the two functions; the settlement of disputes and
enforcement of strike penalties. The New York State Public Em-
ployment Relations Board (PERB) has demonstrated that with
some skillful administration it is possible to walk successfully the
tightrope between dispute resolution and strike penalty enforce-
ment. But its role has not been easy and the Chairman of the New
York State PERB has consistently sought legislative change to re-
lieve the Board of the burden of enforcing strike penalties, primarily
because of the conflict of such duties with the Board's mediation
role.
The potential conflict in New York PERB's statutory duties,
which include the initiation of strike penalty procedures35 and the
enforcement of strike penalties,36 was illustrated in a case involving
a strike of security guards.3" The union claimed the combined
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions of the Board, when strike
penalty enforcement proceedings are instituted by the Board on its
own motion, violate the due process clauses of the first and four-
teenth Amendments. The federal district court upheld the law stat-
ing that the combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions
in one agency does not in itself offend the due process clause. The
court noted, however, that special circumstances could be presented
where the risk of unfairness is intolerably high and that this deter-
35. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 210.3(c).
36. Id. § 210.3(0.
37. New York State Inspection Security and Law Enforcement Employees, District
Council 82, AFSCME. AFL-CIO v. New York State PERB, 17 PuD. EMPLOYEE BaGAN-
wa REP. (CCH) 7002 (1984).
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mination is for the court to make on a case by case basis.38
In Ohio you are fortunate to have as a Board Member Judge
Jack E. Day, whose substantial judicial experience will undoubtedly
aid the Board in solving any dilemmas that may occur as a result of
its dual role.
As for the legislative decision to grant the right to strike to pub-
lic employees or to substitute arbitration when that right is denied,
only the future will tell whether this is a wise choice. But I can say
that the Ohio legislature has recognized the need for a stimulus to
the bargaining process to enable both employees and employers to
make decisions. As a philosopher once observed: nothing is as cer-
tain to focus a person's mind as the certainty that he is to be hung in
the morning. Similarly, the decision to strike, to take a strike, or to
submit to arbitration may stimulate the parties to reach settlements
or to at least makt reasonable proposals.
Finally, I would like to point out that mediation has proven to
be one of the best tools to resolve public employee disputes. Iowa
and Florida, which also rely heavily on the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (FMCS) for assistance, report good results. In
one year Iowa had the benefit of FMCS in 215 cases. Of those
cases, forty were assigned to ad hoc mediators and three were han-
dled by staff mediators. Special Masters proceedings in Florida also
have been aided greatly by the dedicated work of the FMCS. How-
ever, based on my observation of the experiences in Wisconsin,
Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey and New York, I strongly en-
dorse the employment of permanent staff and ad hoc mediators.
Mediation has no jurisdictional boundaries. Furthermore, even if
the FMCS is able to fully meet the enormous seasonal demands of
bargaining under the Ohio statute, there will be the need for con-
stant communication between the Board, the mediator and the par-
ties. Skilled staff mediators and good ad hoc mediators can perform
a most valuable service in evaluating the status of a dispute and
providing insight into the question of whether the legal proceedings,
such as a claim of unfair practices, are merely tactical maneuvers or
serious impediments to settlement.
Mediators can also be most helpful in resolving disputes over
the scope of bargaining, either by eliminating some issues entirely or
by rephrasing them so they do not pose an illegal threat to statutory
management prerogatives.
The unique procedures of the Ohio Law, which require a three-
38. Id
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fifths vote by both the legislative body of the employer and the em-
ployee organization, provide the mediators and the Board with an
opportunity carefully to explain and clarify the proposals to be
voted upon. Skilled dispute settlers can perform a useful service at
this crucial time in the dispute settlement process.
As you know all too well, the statute tends to concentrate the
dispute period to a limited time on the calendar, which may prove
to be more than the FMCS can handle at a particular time. This is
another reason for ad hoe and staff mediators.
I also believe that because the mutually agreed dispute resolu-
tion procedures authorized by the statute require finality, the stat-
ute creates an opportunity for the parties to employ experienced,
available and acceptable ad hoc mediators and neutrals from neigh-
boring jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania and Michigan. I am
not sure whether the Ohio statute actually permits this, but I believe
the point is worth raising. After all, those states have had public
sector bargaining laws providing for arbitration, and in the case of
Pennsylvania also the right to strike, for a number of years. Money
spent on mediation service may also avoid far greater expenditures
for legal causes.
As a member of the legal fraternity, I am not against full em-
ployment for the profession, but it is my belief that the Ohio statute
contemplates that settlement is the name of the game and mediation
is a faster, cheaper and often fairer way of achieving that objective
rather than litigation.
Thus, I heartily endorse the suggestion of Chairman Day that
your legislature authorize the employment of both ad hoc and staff
members in addition to the great help that the FMCS can provide.
Remember, collective bargaining means change. One of the
strongest features of collective bargaining is the possibility for the
parties to change their dispute settlement procedures to meet their
respective needs. The Ohio statute specifically encourages it.
Let me suggest to the critics of the Ohio statute or its adminis-
tration that they also have an opportunity and a responsibility to do
something about the problem, rather than depend solely upon the
legislature or the administrators to deal with their difficulties.
Again I refer to the chance for alternate voluntary dispute proce-
dures. All in all, I suspect that an exciting beginning has occurred
in Ohio in developing an orderly system for dispute settlement in
the public sector. I am confident that, with good administration,
and with the cooperation of the affected parties, any deficiencies in
19851
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the statute or its administration can be overcome in a manner that
will allow the new collective bargaining statute and process to work
in the public interest.
